(i) if the obligation not to contest a dispute had conditional status (a clause whose violation, however trivial, amounts to a refusal); or the Singapore Court also clarified two points: first, “these [legal] principles apply in the same way to arbitration agreements that are no different from other types of contracts with respect to refusal.” Second, there is no need to take a “step in the process,” such as a court action that shows intent to participate before arbitration to justify an unequivocal acceptance of the refusal. In 2015, after various stages in the BVI action, but before it was dismissed, Hualon (by the beneficiary) commenced arbitration proceedings against Marty, pursuant to an arbitration agreement established in the social charter of the Vietnamese subsidiary (the “Charter”). The charges against Marty were essentially the same as in BVI`s complaint. Marty unsuccessfully denied the court`s jurisdiction in court and in the High Court. These decisions were overturned by the Court of Appeal. Marty appealed to the Singapore Supreme Court, which found that Hualon had violated the arbitration agreement by initiating legal proceedings, but that this was not in itself a violation of the law, as no intention of refusal could be demonstrated. Moreover, a party who initiates legal proceedings in violation of an arbitration agreement could never renounce his right of conciliation, since only the innocent party could relinquish its rights through elections. As a result, the Singapore Supreme Court rejected the challenge to Marty`s arbitration court decision (see BMO/BMP [2017] SGHC 127, as part of Legal Update, Singapore High Court finds that the disputes that violated the arbitration agreement did not violate the arbitration agreement). Rafael was actively involved in the regulation of the mission and in the exchange on the scope of the hearing on preliminary issues, so that the offence was not symptomatic of broader rejection behaviour. The Court of Appeal rejected its decision that Hualon rejected the arbitration agreement on a combination of the beginning of the BVI application and the rejection of the Charter because Marty`s counsel accepted that the opening of the proceedings did not in itself constitute a violation of the refusal. The Court, however, found that the opening of a litigation was a first instance, but that it would be free to provide a statement or qualification for the opening of the proceedings which would objectively demonstrate that it had no contradictory intent. It seems that the statement of the other party must be set aside at the same time as the break-up. The result is a kind of rebuttable presumption.

In 1993, Hualon was established as a wholly-stated subsidiary in Vietnam (a subsidiary of Vietnam). One of the Oung brothers, M, was the president of the daughter of Vietnam. The company`s charter for the Vietnamese subsidiary was revised and updated in February 2008 after Hualon`s bankruptcy, and this revised charter was signed by M on behalf of Hualon. The revised charter contained a compromise clause referring disputes between company members to the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC). Several English authorities such as Rederi Kommanditselskaabet Merc-Scandia IV/Couniniotis SA [1980] 2 Lloyd`s Rep 183 (The Mercanaut) have decided that the opening of legal proceedings may be considered a refusal of the arbitration agreement when this occurs in circumstances that prove that the party concerned no longer intends to be bound by the arbitration agreement. In other words, the opening of legal proceedings is not in itself irrefutable evidence of a party`s intention not to be bound by an arbitration agreement.